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Race and the Core Curriculum
in Legal Education
FRANCES LEE ANSLEY

[Professor Ansley taught the following material in a law school course.
Ed.]

Race and the Constitution
It hardly needs saying that the Constitution represents contested and
bloody ground. The celebration of the Constitution's bicentennial brought on a great debate about race and the Constitution. No doubt scholars of differing persuasions would
have raised the race question during the bicentennial in any event, but a highly publicized
speech by Justice Thurgood Marshall underscored the question in a dramatic fashion and
provoked additional responses. Justice Marshall wrote:
The focus of this celebration invites a complacent belief that the vision of those who debated
and compromised in Philadelphia yielded the "more perfect Union" it is said we now enjoy.
I cannot accept this invitation, for I do not believe that the meaning of the Constitution was
forever "fixed" at the Philadelphia Convention. Nor do I find the wisdom, foresight, and sense
of justice exhibited by the framers particularly profound. To the contrary, the government they
devised was defective from the start, requiring several amendments, a civil war, and momentous social transformation to attain the system of constitutional government, and its respect for
the individual freedoms and human rights, that we hold as fundamental today'!

Those in sympathy with Justice Marshall's sentiments rejoiced at his ringing words.
Critics, on the other hand, accused Marshall of "blaming" the founders for "act[ingJ immorally," of having made a "virulent" attack on the framers. 2 One author argued that
Marshall had "bewilderingly given Dred Scott new life" by accepting the Court's representation of the framers' beliefs and instructed the justice to "give up the effort to revive
this foul-smelling corpse."3 The Washington Legal Foundation called for Marshall's resignation because his remarks displayed a "deepseated bitterness and dislike that impair his
capacity."4 William Bradford Reynolds, then Assistant Attorney General of the United
States, stated that Marshall was "absolutely right to remind us" of "the most tragic aspects
of the American experience" but expressed grave concern that the substance of Marshall's
analysis was to consign the original unreconstructed Constitution "to the dustbin of hisCopyright © 1991 by California Law Review, Inc. Reprinted from California Law Review, Vol. 79, pp. 1511,
1539-51, 1560-61, by permission.
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tory." In Reynolds' view such a move would itself be tragic because" [n]otwithstanding its
very serious flaws, the Constitution in its original form constituted the greatest advance
for human liberty in the entire history of mankind, then or since."5
After a brief sociolegal introduction to the institution of slavery, we began to explore the
drafting of the Constitution with respect to slavery, what one author has called "the witch
at the christening. "6 We looked first at the Declaration of Independence, a comfortably familiar document, but went on to read about a less well-known episode in the Declaration's
history. When Thomas Jefferson first drafted the Declaration of Independence, he included
a passage that was highly critical of George III for sanctioning the slave trade. However,
the passage was eventually purged from the document.
The Constitution of 1787 is a monument to silence on the slavery question. Although
the reality of eighteenth-century chattel slavery is built into the structure of the Constitution of 1787, the word" slavery" never appears in the document. It is quite possible for
an uninformed twentieth-century reader to scan the entire 1787 Constitution with moderate care and never realize that slavery was an issue for the framers, let alone that the Constitution embodied a series of conscious and momentous decisions on the slavery question
for the nascent republic.
In the three-fifths clause, "free Persons, including those bound to Service for a Term of
Years, and excluding Indians not taxed" were counted for purposes of determining a
state's representation in the House of Representatives (and for purposes of apportionment
of direct taxes), while only three-fifths of "all other persons" were to be counted.? The
"other persons" were slaves. This provision most often appears in contemporary popular
rhetoric as proof that slaves were devalued by the Constitution of 1787 because each was
counted as only three-fifths of a person-less than a full human being. Though the substance of the rhetorical point is well taken, nevertheless, the more each slave counted, the
better for the perpetuation of slavery. Antislavery forces wanted slaves to count for nothing. Slaves, after all, would not vote or otherwise exercise political power. Therefore, each
enslaved African-American who "counted" for anything simply helped to increase the
representation of slaveholding states, in effect increasing the political clout of his or her
master and tipping the balance of power in the Congress more toward the proslavery
forces.
The slave trade clause forbade Congress to outlaw the slave trade until 1808. 8 Given the
history of the issue, proponents of the trade had reason to fear federal action. Abolitionist
forces had attacked the international slave trade early on as one of the most vulnerable
components in the then-existing infrastructure of slavery, and this trade was subjected to
restrictive regulation in various states, both North and South, from colonial times onward.
Even some who supported slavery found it possible to condemn the international trade.
The slave trade clause of the Constitution of 1787 ensured the trade continued until 1808,
and article V put any shortening of that guaranteed time beyond all amendment. 9
The fugitive slave clause required free states to recognize escaped slaves as the legal property of their owners and required them to return such fugitives into bondage. lO It was this
clause that eventually generated much of the abolitionist heat preceding the Civil War.
Various other provisions of the 1787 Constitution related directly or indirectly to slavery,
and constitutional scholars have proposed numerous ways to categorize and elucidate
them. Other clauses frequently mentioned include those pertaining to the use of the militia to suppress insurrections, prohibition on export taxes, and the requirement that constitutional amendments could only be proposed by a two-thirds supermajority of Congress
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or of petitioning states. In class we looked at all these provisions. After listing and decoding them, however, we were faced with the more difficult task of evaluating and interpreting. What do these provisions mean? Why should anyone care about these arcane and
coded messages now that the thirteenth amendment is the law of the land?
I introduced Thurgood Marshall's bicentennial speech, his act of interpretation. I also introduced the observations of Don Fehrenbacher, who views the Constitution of 1787 as a
compromise that contained both proslavery and antislavery provisions but which at bottom "dealt only minimally and peripherally with slavery and was essentially open-ended
on the subject."n
We began grappling with our varying and sometimes diametrically opposed reactions to
the slavery compromise; students displayed a wide range of opinions. [The following statements are reactions by the students in Professor Ansley's class. Ed.]
Of the readings that we have done, the ones that have surprised me the most are those that dealt
with how the founding fathers dealt with the issue of slavery. I had never thought about how
the framers had wrestled with this problem.
I just wanted to say that I have never had a black professor in the seventeen years of my continuing education. It was not until this class that the Constitution and its Framers had ever been
presented to me as anything but perfect, ingenious, and insightful. I am glad that I now know
the Constitution has its flaws.
. I'm shocked that this has never been pointed out to me before. Growing up within the inner circle, and being educated there-it's like a select existence
which doesn't want to face the realities of those on the fringe. I feel lucky to be moving, although slowly, outward.
I am a thirty-five year old, white, Anglo-Saxon Protestant. . .. I was born and raised ... in
the Northeast. I attended high school with a black population of some 80%. I was a minority.
When racial violence struck Detroit, Newark and many other cities in the 1960's, it struck my
town as well. I have witnessed first-hand a black person get beaten up solely because he was
black and I have seen white persons get beaten simply because they were white. I know from
experience that hatred exists in both white and black men. I have heard words spoken to the effect that the white man owes the black man something because of a thing called slavery. In response to those words I have always felt that the point was moot. I believed that what happened
. .. should be forgotten, that it was a dead issue and not relevant in twentieth century America. I think I may have been mistaken.
Unqualified praise of the Constitution's framers should cause uneasiness. That seems reasonable. Thurgood Marshall's apparent outrage (especially if it reflects shock on his part at the
framers' duality of mindset and purpose) seems less so and is perhaps a bit disingenuous. The
seeming (and at times, quite real) hypocrisy of politicians has long been recognized....
The Constitution was an attempt to create a flexible framework for rational government
in the context of a world filled with regimes exercising arbitrary power. .. It indeed represented the naked self-interest of the white men who drafted and signed it. But it also represented an enlightened self-interest. It allowed for change at a later date and therein lies the
"morality" of this or any such document.
In all truthfulness, Marshall's speech angered me as I read it. However, I tried to put myself in
"his shoes," but it is a viewpoint I have never had to experience. I never thought a July 4th celebration or a celebration for our Constitution would arouse such ill-feelings.
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I know this probably sounds like "rose colored glasses" stuff, but I truly believe all persons are
created equal. And even if the Framers of the Constitution were not sure who they meant when
they used a similar phrase, I am.

Some students viewed the problem as one of inadequate information. Many thought
that the framers simply had no way of knowing the evils that would result from slavery
and had not been exposed to our now widely shared modern sensibilities on the subject of
racial justice. Those who focused on economic realities drew radically different conclusions.
Some expressed the view that the accommodation of slavery was "just economics," and
therefore somehow had no real racial or moral dimension, while others thought that the
economic motive made the moral dissonance all the more intense. Some perceived the basic question to be whether the framers, and the document they created, were "good" or
"bad." Others were more willing to entertain the idea of an openly ambivalent response.
Questions about the existence, meaning, and discoverability of original intent became unavoidable as we explored the motives and statements of various founders and studied their
debates. The question of intent and its meaning led us to consider other possible values that
might guide us in the process of constitutional interpretation.
We then turned to the heated debate that took place over a hundred years ago among
abolitionists as to whether the 1787 Constitution was proslavery or antislavery. The Garrisonian wing of the abolitionist movement concluded that the Constitution was irretrievably proslavery and should be repudiated, by means of "disunion" if necessary. Another
group preached that the Constitution permitted and even mandated immediate abolition of
slavery. Others, including eventually Frederick Douglass, conceded that the Constitution
did not mandate abolition but argued that there were antislavery features in the constitutional text itself that could provide a basis for antislavery politics and eventual victory
within the union. Then as now, these disagreements about the framers generated much
heat because they were seen as relevant to contemporaneous controversies that bitterly divided the public.
[The following are anonymous student comments on Professor Ansley's course. Ed.]
This has been one of the very few classes here that has stimulated independent thinking for me.
The class was simply a forum for blacks to vent their anger. White students' comments were
passed over many times ... or countered angrily or laughingly by black students.... [M]any
whites felt they couldn't speak because the blacks would become so offended and angry. This
class simply increased the racial tension between the students-instead of educating the students to difi~ring viewpoints.
On the whole, this was an interesting course and I think the professor has a true commitment
to anti-discrimination. It must be risky to stand in front of a class and hear people's opinions
that are racist and not respond, or even harder, to respond. Several times I found it almost impossible not to jump up and leave because comments were made that were blatantly racist and
should have been nixed I

White students who have had little opportunity to think and talk about these issues may
be experiencing high levels of anxiety and conflict. One of my white students told me her
perspective on this:
I have become more comfortable with the overall subject matter that i~ explored in this class.
Getting off the slavery issue is in no small way responsible for this more comfortable feeling. I
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didn't have to examine myself very deeply to understand why this is true. I didn't have to consider if I am a "closet racist."
I feel that the reason for this is that we are now getting into issues about which I do not feel totally alienated. I have never been black, therefore, I couldn't possibly know the feelings of those
who are and who feel that their color has played a major role in keeping them from doing whatever they chose to do. I seemed to experience the most problems when I did try to put myself
in the shoes of others and sometimes felt that somewhere, somehow, I should have done something to try to make the situation better. Then the old guilt feelings took over and eventually I
would become angry with myself and probably with the people for which I had been concerned,
and I would think, I didn't do these things, then why should I feel like lowe anything to anybody. What emerged here was a vicious cycle of ill feelings, sometimes directed at others and
sometimes directed at myself. I wanted to literally let out a giant WHEW when we moved on.
Similarly, members of racial minorities in a predominantly white group discussing matters of race often feel in a bind that few white people have imagined. One of my black students told me about his feelings:
In all candor I chose to take this course by default.... I had little desire to take a class about discrimination offered by a school where my race (African-American) comprised a numerical minority.
It has been my experience that most white people are really not very interested in hearing about
the problems that black people face in this country because of their blackness. The scenario is
an all too familiar one. First, the subject is opened. Next comes a rush of well-travelled cliches
in an attempt either to prove the absence of bigotry in the speaker, or to demonstrate a deep understanding of the problem. Finally, conclusory and transitional statements ease the conversation into another more worthy direction. Attempts to re-open discussion and show that bigotry
wears many faces, sometimes including the face that stares out of the mirror, are met with
pained expressions and impatience. .
These interfaces, though typically low-key, invariably
result in ulcer-like abdominal pain for the African-American.

My experience has been that most white people aren't really very interested in hearing about
the travails of the African in America. As an African-American, however, it's difficult for me
not to speak about relevant facts in our history....
Most black people know that most white people aren't particularly interested in hearing about
their struggles. As a result, soon after they apprehend this, they simply don't initiate conversation on the subject. No one, black or white, enjoys having something which they hold in great
esteem minimized.

Notes
1. The precise event was the Annual Seminar of the San Francisco Patent and Trademark Law
Association in Maui, Hawaii, on May 6, 1987. See Thurgood Marshall, Commentary: Reflections on
the Bicentennial of the United States Constitution, 101 HARv. L. REV. 1 (1987); Thurgood Marshall,
The Constitution: A Living Document, 30 How. L.J. 915 (1987) (symposium issue celebrating bicentennial).
2. Don Fehrenbacher, author of the 1978000k The Dred Scott Case: Its Significance in American Law and Politics, chose thus to characterize Justice Marshall's thesis in a bicentennial speech at
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the University of Tennessee. Address by Don Fehrenbacher, University of Tennessee (Sept. 19,
1988).
3. Erik M. Jensen, Commentary: The Extraordinary Revival of Dred Scott, 66 WASH. U. L.Q. 1,
2, 10 (1988).
4. Ted Gest, Justice Marshall's Minority Report, 102 U.S. NEWS
at 12.

&

WORLD REP., May 18,1987,

5. William Bradford Reynolds, Another View: Our Magnificent Constitution, 40 VAND. L. REV.
1343, 1345, 1346 (1987).

6. See William M. Wiecek, The Witch at the Christening: Slavery and the Constitution's Origins, in THE FRAMING AND RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 167 (Leonard W. Levy & Dennis J.
Mahoney eds., 1987).
7. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 2, cl. 3.

8. Id. § 9, cl. 1. The clause reads: "The Migration or Importation of Such Persons as any of the
States now existing shall think proper to admit, shall not be prohibited by the Congress prior to the
Year one thousand eight hundred and eight...
9. U.S. CaNST. art. V ("[N]o Amendment which may be made prior to the Year One thousand
eight hundred and eight shall in any Manner affect the first and fourth Clauses in the Ninth Section
of the first Article .... ").

10. Id. art. IV, § 2, d. 2. The clause reads:
A Person charged in any State with Treason, Felony, or other Crime, who shall flee from Justice, and be found in another State, shall on Demand of the executive Authority of the State
from which he fled, be delivered up, to be removed to the State having Jurisdiction of the Crime.
11. Fehrenbacher identified the two major antislavery provisions as (1) the territory clause, which
he believes gave Congress the power to exclude slavery from the territories, and (2) the commerce
clause, under which he believes Congress could regulate or abolish the slave trade after the slave trade
clause expired in 1807. See Don E. Fehrenbacher, Slavery, the Framers, and the Living Constitution,
in SLAVERY AND iTs CONSEQUENCES 1, 13 (Robert A. Goldwin & Art Kaufman eds., 1988).
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